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A LEGAL ALTERNATIVE TO INSTABILITY IN
INTERNATIONAL OIL
MICHAEL C. JOHNSON*
The instability of international oil concession arrangements
caused by the absence of appropriate legal methods to deal with
disputes as they arise is the problem treated in this article. A spe-
cific proposal for solution of this problem is presented.
I
INTERNATIONAL OIL CONTEXT
Oil is sui generis. Recognition of this pervasive fact is a condition
precedent to any intelligible discussion of the legal aspects of inter-
national oil concession arrangements.
The combination of two sets of factors appears to account for
the unique character of oil. First, oil is presently, and for the forsee-
able future, the greatest single source of energy relied upon by the
Western industrialized ("consuming") countries; such reliance is
almost exclusive because of the economic structure of industry fuel
requirements. Second, with the qualified exception of the United
States, the consuming countries depend on a few developing coun-
tries for most of their petroleum requirements; although the pos-
sibility exists that this dependence may be reduced in the future, so
far this dependence has continued to grow.
Oil is presently the greatest source of energy used by the consum-
ing countries. For example, the foreign oil industry (outside the
United States) supplies approximately one-half of the foreign free
world's energy requirements.' The best available evidence indicates
that these consuming countries will use at least as much and prob-
ably more oil in relation to total fuel for most of the remainder of
this century. For example, if the energy demand grows at a rate
parallel to the economic growth projected for these consuming
countries, the demand may increase by two and one-half times over
the next twenty-five years. It is likely that oil will have to supply
the biggest part of that increase.' It may be true that the cost of
* Law Dep't, First National Bank of Chicago. Member of the Illinois Bar.
1. G. Burck, The Boiling World of Oil, Fortune, Feb. 1965, p. 126.
2. 215 The Economist 1155 (1965).
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nuclear energy is approaching a substantially competitive position
vis-i-vis that of petroleum. Nevertheless, the dynamic growth of
total energy demand should preclude any market gains for nuclear
fuel at the expense of petroleum. Further, it is arguable that, apart
from price competition, the structural problem of conversion of en-
ergy requirements from oil to nuclear fuel may prolong the relative
growth of nuclear fuel for some time beyond this century. For ex-
ample, nuclear fuel seems more structurally adaptable to the gen-
eration of electric power than to the production of small vehicular
power. Thus, some petroleum user markets, like the automobile
and aircraft user markets, may not be affected for some time by the
price economies of nuclear fuel. It also appears that the thrust of
nuclear fuel replacement is primarily directed at the much more
vulnerable coal and water consumption markets rather than the
oil consumption markets. Therefore, the enormous growth in en-
ergy requirements predicted for the rest of this century and the
structural reliance of industries on petroleum assure an increase in
the absolute supply of oil and caution against the possibility of a
decline in the relative supply of oil to total fuel.
Fortuitous events cause the consuming countries to reach far in
terms of both geography and politics for the supply of their oil
needs. Their dependence on developing countries for this supply
is attributable to the facts that most of the known foreign free-
world oil is located within a few developing countries and that al-
ternatives to current oil trade arrangements between the developing
and the consuming countries are presently non-existent.
The eight oil producing countries belonging to the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)-namely, Venezuela,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Qatar, Lybia, and Indonesia-
account for three-fourths of the free world's crude-oil production
outside the United States and eighty per cent of the total free world
reserves.' In addition, the trend is toward an increase in the con-
centration of a crude oil supply within these developing countries.
The output of crude from the old-established producing countries
has continued to forge ahead-much more rapidly in the Middle
East than in the (higher cost) Western hemisphere. Offshore produc-
tion has been mounting in the Persian Gulf, exports have begun
from the Murban field in Abu Dhabi, and substantial discoveries
have been confirmed in Oman. Progress is rapid in Lybia, much more
3. Burck, supra note 1, at 127.
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so than in Algeria, while Argentina is in the process of becoming a
major exporter. On the other side of the world, Australia has at
last become a commercial producer. Thus, developments in 1964
have helped to sustain the growth of crude reserves .... 4
A further trend is in the direction of an increased dependence of
consuming countries, especially those belonging to the European
Economic Community (EEC), upon petroleum imports.5
The unavailability of alternatives is demonstrated by the impos-
sibility of substantial stockpiling of oil and the absence of substantial
petroleum reserves within the consuming countries (exclusive of the
United States). Particular reference is made here to the North Sea
exploration. The insurmountable barrier to large-scale storage of
petroleum within the consuming countries is that petroleum is prac-
tically conservable only at its locus-that is, where it is discovered
in the subsoil.
[O]il, unlike hard fuel, cannot easily be stockpiled for eventualities.
For a known date, a special effort can be made; in 1944 the United
Kingdom was able to tuck away 23 million tons for D-Day. But
large quantities cannot be put by in artificial containers for some time
or never, both because containers of the necessary size are so expen-
sive that the capital investment is almost prohibitive, and because the
oil deteriorates. The only proven way of hoarding oil is to discover
it and close it in till wanted-that is to conserve it in its natural
sub-soil.6
Location of the oil outside the consuming countries together with
the impossibility of stockpiling and the non-existence of a secondary
source of supply means that the only practical way to protect the
oil supply is to influence the stability of conditions relating to the
oil exporting countries. The importance of stabilizaton of oil con-
ditions is elevated to a critical level when the strategic fact of ex-
clusive reliance on oil by the consuming countries is considered. The
impact of a severance of supply of Middle Eastern oil, for example,
would surely be severe. An effective cut-off of such oil could quickly
bring Britain, Japan, and the Common Market countries to their
knees. Where could Britain turn for replacement of the loss of two-
thirds of its total oil supply, Japan for three-fourths, and the EEC
4. 31 Petroleum Press Service 444 (1964).
5. Id. at 57-58 (1965).
6. E. Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East 1914-1956, 97 (Johns Hopkins
Press 1963).
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for sixty per cent? The Suez crisis demonstrated that the United
States can temporarily intervene to suspend the crippling effect of
a severance of Middle Eastern oil. However, the enormous costs
and drain of oil reserves involved in this American action merely
emphasized the stop-gap usefulness of such intervention. The cen-
tral problem of stability of the individual concession arrangements
persists.
These considerations also help to explain the intensity of response
by consuming countries to external threats directed at the security
of the oil supply. Such a response was the armed action taken by
France and Britain in Suez to "protect the oil."'7 However, a sig-
nificant distinction lies with respect to internal threats to the oil
supply. It appears that the predominant responsibility for securing
oil supply arrangements from internal adverse conditions rests with
the parties to the arrangements, the international oil companies and
exporting governments, and not with any Western government.
Therefore, the problem of stabilization of oil concession arrange-
ments may be treated best at the concession agreement stage. The
proposal advanced below is based on this approach to the problem.
The lack of stability of present oil concession arrangements is
caused by the lack of appropriate legal methods to effectively deal
with differences in the first instance. Persuasive evidence that present
procedures are inappropriate is the fact that the parties have gen-
erally chosen to use other methods to pursue their disputes. An il-
lustration is the OPEC settlement concluded early in 1965.8 There,
the parties selected the method of negotiation outside the concession
arrangements (for two and one-half years) in preference to arbi-
tration or conciliation or other procedures provided in the conces-
sions. Thus, an extra-legal method was selected by the parties to
settle the issues which included "royalty expensing" and "posted
pricing." The negative inference is that the parties deemed the con-
cession procedures unsuitable for dealing with the causes of their
dispute. It may be argued that the OPEC dispute is distinguishable
on the ground that it involved several concession arrangements and
a strong world oil industry interest. Consequently, the industry
negotiation beyond concession procedures was necessary and the
selection of such a method does not bear on the appropriateness
of concession procedures for treatment of local disputes. However,
7. H. Finer, Dulles Over Suez: The Theory and Practice of His Diplomacy 63
(Quadrangle Books 1964).
8. 214The Economist 351 (1965).
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the answer to this argument is clear. Although the issues of the
dispute were generally common to the parties, the respective in-
terests of the parties in the terms of settlement varied. Moreover,
the interests of OPEC governments and some oil companies in-
evitably differed. This proposition is substantiated by the fact that
after the oil companies offered to settle with OPEC and OPEC
was willing to accept, nevertheless, OPEC returned the decision to
accept or reject the offer to each member government because of
the incongruity of member government interests.
Other evidence of the inadequacy of concession procedures for
settling disputes is the conspicuous history of general non-use of
procedures such as arbitration despite the frequency of concession
differences. Of course, the extent of the use of arbitration and other
settlement procedures does not bear on the value of concession arbi-
tration clauses for choice of law purposes. It is conceded that the
arbitration clause greatly contributes to place the concession agree-
ment in the domain of international law rather than local law.
Furthermore, the fact that arbitration has been used successfully
on a few occasions does not detract from its general inactivity in
the face of recurring dissatisfactions and disputes; nor does it meet
the evidence of a pattern of resort to ad hoc methods to resolve
disputes of the allocative kind, like those involved in the OPEC
dispute.
It has been stated that the main reason for the non-use of arbitra-
tion and other concession procedures is the preference of govern-
ment officials for argument in private rather than in front of third
parties. Another reason for the avoidance of arbitration may be
the inherent delay in activation of the arbitration machinery.' 0 How-
ever, it appears that the strongest reason for the avoidance of arbi-
tration and other concession procedures is the tacit recognition by
interested parties that adjudication by arbitration would be an in-
appropriate, and hence an unacceptable determination of allocative
issues such as royalty expensing, pricing, and taxing which usually
arise within the concession context. This subject is further discussed
below.
It could be argued that, even if present concession arrangements
do not provide appropriate procedures for dispute settlement, their
stability is not thereby impaired. Rather, the argument goes, resort
9. Monroe, op. cit. supra note 6, at 108.
10. S. G. Siskek, The Legal Framework for Oil Concessions in the Arab World
417 (Middle East Research & Publishing Center 1960).
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to an external method of settlement may be as effective as an internal
method. The short answer is that the concession method is more ef-
fective, assuming it is suitable for treatment of the dispute, because
it is available as a matter of legal right. An external method, even if
suitable for dealing with the dispute, is less effective because its op-
eration depends on the discretion of both parties. Either or both
parties may foreclose or terminate resort to the method. Conse-
quently, its application is arbitrary. It is this absence of legal cer-
tainty about application of the method which permits the dispute to
have such an unsettling effect on concession relationships. Conversely,
the presence of a legal guarantee that a suitable settlement method
will be applied tends to check the disturbing consequences of a dis-
pute and to stabilize concession relations at the most important
stage-that is, at the point when a dispute arises.
Once again, the recent OPEC case is relevant to this discussion.
OPEC elected to pursue the method of industry negotiation with
the oil companies. Neither the concession nor any other law con-
ferred upon OPEC an enforceable right to secure oil company par-
ticipation in the negotiation process. Conversely, the oil companies
had a "right" not to participate. The "right" not to participate, it is
suggested, seriously undermined the effectiveness of the negotiations.
The absence of legality caused an uncertainty in concession relations
and the appearance that the oil companies were granting the dis-
cussions as a matter of grace. The latter adversely affected the rela-
tive bargaining attitudes and efforts of the parties.
It is arguable that the companies' "right" not to participate in
the negotiations meant very little because non-participation was
really not an alternative. The companies had to negotiate because
of the power possessed by OPEC governments to terminate con-
cessions. The reply to this objection is twofold. First, it is question-
able whether the incentives were strong enough for OPEC govern-
ments to terminate concessions in the event of the companies' refusal
to negotiate with OPEC. The member governments have varying
economic and political intentions. One or more governments might
prefer to negotiate directly with its concession companies rather
than threaten termination or actually terminate the concession be-
cause of the companies' failure to participate in industry negotiations
with OPEC. Second, even if the termination power and policy might
be aligned with the OPEC negotiators, the mere casting of doubt on
the legality of OPEC's action is harmful to the relations between
the parties and to the application of the negotiation method. To say
that an organization of governments is acting illegally is to politi-
Jut.y, 1966]
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cally embarrass and perhaps insult the member governments. The
consequence is that concession relations and actual negotiations tend
to become more difficult and less effective.
Another criticism might be that the external negotiations were
nevertheless successful because a settlement was finally reached.
Such an assertion is based upon the end-justifies-the-means approach.
The problems with this assertion are, first, that in a concession dis-
pute settlement, the means of settlement is often more important
than the result; second, the settlement reached in the OPEC case
was not concerned with the cause of concession instability which ac-
companied the course of the dispute. In the OPEC case, negotiations
were conducted over a period of two and one-half years and it is
possible that the damage done to the security of concession relation-
ships over that period is irreparable. In any event, the problem of
curing the weakness of such relationships is substantial. The even-
tual settlement of the OPEC dispute did not even consider the cause
of instability which grew out of the handling (or mishandling) of
the dispute. The cause was the absence of a legally assured form of
participation in the resolution of concession disputes. The uncer-
tainty of future participation in a legal method of dispute settlement
remains. The proposal submitted below seeks to eliminate this cause
of concession instability.
The irrelevance of most contemporary legal discussion regarding
the question of stability of international oil arrangements should be
noted. Instead of discussing how concession arrangements may be
made to work better and thereby strengthened, prominent interna-
tional legal writers have preferred to discuss the doctrinal positions
outlined by classical international law relevant to the issue of
whether a government has the "right" to unilaterally modify its
obligation to a private foreign party under certain circumstances-
the continuing argument of pacta sunt servanda versus rebus sic
stantibus." This doctrinal discussion is irrelevant because, whether
or not a government has a "right" to unilaterally revise its conces-
sion, as the OPEC settlement demonstrates, governments may view
their compliance with concession agreements as increasingly difficult
and perhaps impossible without revision. Therefore, the question for
the oil companies is not whether governments have the "right" to
demand a revision but how to deal with their claims. The latter ques-
tion relates directly to the stability of concession arrangements. A
11. Id. at 49, 55.
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more relevant approach to the question is similar to the "middle
course" referred to by Professor Fuller:
[I]t is simultaneously desirable that laws should remain stable
through time and that they should be such as impose no insurmount-
able barriers to obedience. Yet rapid changes in circumstances, such as
those attending an inflation, may render obedience to a particular law
which was once easy, increasingly difficult to the point of approach-
ing impossibility. Here again, it may become necessary to pursue
a middle course which involves some impairment of both desiderata. 12
II
LEGAL ALTERNATIVE OF GOOD FAITH BARGAINING
The proposal recommended herein is addressed primarily to the
oil exporting countries and to the major international oil companies.
However, many of the suggestions apply to all contemplated con-
cession arrangements. The proposal is directed toward the making
of new concession agreements. However, it may be used as the basis
for changing existing concession arrangements. The differentiation
of oil "exporting" countries is made for several reasons. First, the
major concession activity is carried on by these countries. Second,
the element of uncertainty in the presence of commercial oil is sub-
stantially reduced. Third, urging action within a given organiza-
tional framework (OPEC) promises more favorable results.
Fourth, the oil exporting governments have acquired an important
degree of sophistication in negotiation. The differentiation of the
international majors is also convenient for the purposes of this
paper. The major oil companies-Standard of New Jersey, Royal
Dutch/Shell, Gulf, Texaco, British Petroleum, Socony Mobil, and
Standard of California-do approximately seventy per cent of the
foreign oil business directly and, through such devices as long term
contracts with independents, substantially influence the rest of the
world market.' 3 It will be seen that this market power is a desirable
condition for application of the proposal. However, this does not
mean that independents may not find the proposal applicable to their
particular situations. The majors form a definable group which is
materially interested in the stability of international oil arrange-
12. L. L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 45 (Yale Univ. Press 1964).
13. Burck, supra note 1, at 126, 221.
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ments; consequently, they may be more likely to act on this proposal.
The proposal which is recommended is briefly described at this
point; the discussion of it and the various alternatives is postponed
temporarily. It is proposed that the legal method of compulsory
good faith bargaining be applied within the framework of conces-
sion arrangements. The subject matter appropriate for bargaining
may be defined as the allocative (or apportionment) issues. The
allocative issues arising in the oil concession arrangements are com-
monly referred to as "financial." This is a convenient term for in-
clusion of the following classes of allocative sub-issues: pricing,
taxing, proration, royalty, and perhaps relinquishment. The nature
and extent of the duty to bargain in good faith may be determined
by analogy with the American domestic labor law concept of good
faith bargaining. The subjective test of good faith will be limited to
bargaining conduct that does not bear on the substantive results of
the process. The choice is made to favor free substantive negotiation
over the extension of legal compulsion to bargaining practice. It is
recommended that compulsory bargaining start to operate after the
oil concern has recovered its initial capital investment plus a "rea-
sonable" return on the investment. This more than covers the oil
companies' reliance interest. Thereafter, it is suggested that com-
pulsory bargaining become operative only periodically. In this way
the proper balance between stability and adjustability of the arrange-
ment to material changes in conditions may be achieved. A reason-
able period may be from three to five years. If the proposal is relied
upon to implement compulsory bargaining in existing arrangements,
the capital recovery period seems irrelevant. It is urged that the duty
of enforcement of compulsory bargaining be placed with a continuing
adjudicative tribunal, whether on a full time or standby basis, estab-
lished at the industry level by joint authorization of the OPEC and
company concession participants. This would be the most desirable
arrangement, for it assures the widest application of authoritative
determinations and lays the proper foundation for expert and con-
sistent development of the law. However, this adjudicative pro-
cedure requires broad industry acceptance. Alternatively, provision
would have to be made at the concession level for an ad hoc enforce-
ment tribunal. In either case, enforcement power of the tribunal
is limited to an authoritative determination on the issue of bad
faith. Thus, the remedy lies solely with the willingness of the wrong-
ful party to comply with the authoritative determination. Of course,
the failure of a party to comply in the second instance automatically
[VOL. 6
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raises the issue of termination, which is subject to arbitration under
most existing concession provisions.
This proposal may be equally applicable to the two major types
of concession arrangements presently in force. One is the fifty-fifty
profit sharing arrangement and the other is the so-called "partner-
ship" arrangement. Differentiation between the two schemes pivots
on investment and profit allocations. The fifty-fifty plan calls for the
company alone to provide the needed capital for exploitation and
for the government and company to share equally in the net op-
erating profits after a deduction, among others, for royalty pay-
ments to the government (until the recent OPEC settlement). The
partnership plan calls for the government and company to share
the investment burden equally and for the government to obtain
a greater portion of net operating profits-for instance, a formula
of seventy-five and twenty-five. In both arrangements the parties
are expressly committed to a good faith standard of conduct. How-
ever, in neither are they required by the terms of the concession to
open the allocative terms for redetermination, with the possible ex-
ception of the recent Iranian concessions to be discussed below.
Further, it seems that good faith may have a different meaning in
these types of arrangements (whatever it is) than when it is applied
in the legal context to define bargaining conduct as in the present
proposal.
III
APPLICATION OF GOOD FAITH BARGAINING METHOD14
Professor Fuller defines adjudication as "a social process of deci-
sion which assures to the affected party a particular form of partici-
pation, that of presenting proofs and arguments for a decision in his
favor."' 5 Similarly, the bargaining technique can be defined as a
social process of decision which assures the affected party both sub-
stantive participation in and consent to the outcome. Participation
and consent are achieved through the discussion of proposals and
counterproposals progressing toward a common ground of settle-
ment. Bargaining is not only distinct in the substantive participation
14. In this discussion the terms "bargaining" and "negotiation" are used inter-
changeably. The terms bargaining "technique," "method," or "process" include both the
duty of good faith bargaining and the accompanying adjudicative enforcement.
15. L. L. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. Rev. 3, 19.
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and consent it guarantees, but also in its compulsion of participation
by a recalcitrant party.
On the effectiveness of the bargaining process as applied to labor
relations, Professor Fuller has said:
Taking the system as a whole, and viewing it across considerable
periods of time, I should say that it works remarkably well. Indeed
I believe that our system of industrial self government is one of the
finest expressions of the American genius for political arrangements.' 6
Professor Cox made this measured evaluation of the success of the
bargaining method:
There are undoubtedly labor-relations advisors who have made good
the promise to talk a union to death without either signing a contract
or involving the employer in unfair labor practice proceedings; but
• . . the duty to bargain in good faith seems on the whole to have
been remarkably effective . . . . Many empty discussions were grad-
ually and unconsciously transformed into a bona fide exchange of
ideas leading to mutual persuasion .... 17
Further, Judge Henry J. Friendly, in his Holmes Lectures, com-
mended the National Labor Relations Board for its enforcement
work in clearly elaborating the rules defining unfair labor practices.'
It appears that the effectiveness of the labor bargaining process
can be measured by the extent of its accomplishment of the legisla-
tive objectives 9 which underly Section 8(a) (5) of the National
Labor Relations Act. 20 The first objective was industrial peace. This
has been realized by the legislation of compulsory union recognition.
A second objective was to create economic power for the unions to
counterbalance the power of corporations over labor standards.
This objective appears to have been substantially accomplished. The
third objective was to give the unions some, perhaps equal, partici-
pation in the determination of conditions of employment. It is clear
that unions participate in the determination of employment condi-
tions but it is not clear how much they participate. It may be said
that this objective has been partly, if not substantially, achieved. The
16. Id. at 45.
17. A. Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1401, 1439(1958).
18. H. J. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies 36 (Harvard Univ. Press
1962).
19. Cox, supra note 17, at 1401.
20. 49Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §158(a) (5) (1964).
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fourth objective was to create a process of rational persuasion. It is
not clear at all whether and to what extent this goal has been ac-
complished. Professor Cox points to the paradox which exists in the
application of the bargaining technique.
Collective bargaining is curiously ambivalent even today. In one
aspect collective bargaining is a brute contest of economic power
somewhat masked by polite manners and voluminous statistics. As
the relation matures, Lilliputian bonds control the opposing concen-
trations of economic power; they lack legal sanctions but are none-
theless effective to contain the use of power. Initially it may be only
fear of the economic consequences of disagreement that turns the
parties to facts, reason, a sense of responsibility, a responsiveness to
government and public opinion, and moral principle; but in time these
forces generate their own compulsions, and negotiating a contract ap-
proaches the ideal of informed persuasion. 2'
The bargaining process would be appropriate and hence effective
if applied to concession arrangements because concession arrange-
ments satisfy the conditions relevant to the effectiveness of bargain-
ing in the labor situation and in general. Of the following conditions,
the first two are necessary for the application of bargaining and the
remainder are conducive to good bargaining practice.
J. Reciprocity of Interests
The concession relationship contains the element of reciprocity of
interests necessary to create the subject matter for bargaining, that
is, the disputed issue. This condition makes the modest point that
the basis of the relationship necessary for application of the bargain-
ing process is that of reciprocity rather than harmony. 2 The parties
must differ in their relative interests so that each sufficiently values
the relationship of the other. The basis of the relationship may be
an exchange or collaboration.
In either case, the contribution made by one party is seen by him
as less important than the contribution made by the other. The more
important contribution made by the other is the benefit of the bar-
gain to the first party. It seems to make no difference whether the
form of contribution is a transfer of an object or a performance of
a service (or the promise of either). In the final analysis the parties
value each other's contribution differently and each seeks to increase
21. Cox, supra note 17, at 1409.
22. L. L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, Nov. 1957 (unpublished
paper in Harvard Law School Library.)
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his benefit of the bargain. It seems to follow that, for the same rea-
sons, they are likely to evaluate differently the terms involved in
arranging for the contributions. This is how the subject matter of
disputes originates and why the element of reciprocity is a necessary
condition precedent to bargaining.
23
Both the labor and concession relationships meet this test. Each
involves an ongoing collaboration. Labor and management favor-
ably value the respective contributions of labor resources and
capital-management. Likewise, governments and oil companies
favorably value the respective contributions of oil resources and
capital-management. At the same time, both the unions and govern-
ments commonly differ with the companies in the evaluation of the
proper apportionment of income earned by the enterprise. One im-
portant influence on this evaluation which is common to both govern-
ments and unions is the projection of a "collective" interest into
the allocative negotiation. This collective interest seems to be some-
what of a consensus of the represented group. It may take the form
of nationalism in the government case.
B. Sufficiency of Interests
The oil companies and governments share a sufficient interest in
maintaining the concession relationship that the application of bar-
gaining would not be endangered by the possibility of termination
of relations. This point is related to point A supra. Whereas in
point A the parties must have different interests that cause different
evaluations of the same object, in point B the parties must have the
same interest in maintaining the relationship founded on different
interests. The common interest in preserving the relationship must
be sufficient to provide appropriate incentives for each party to be
willing to seek a settlement through bargaining rather than abandon
the relationship. It appears that the extent of interest the parties
have in preservation is directly related to the extent of their willing-
ness to bargain and consequently is related to their bargaining
positions.
In one respect, the labor and oil situations manifest a similar kind
of common interest in continuity of relations. The company's con-
tinuity objective in both cases is governed by its profitability notion.
In contrast, the union or government has a continuity objective
shaped by the potentially competing interests in maximization of in-
come and security of position in the arrangement. The former
23. But cf. F. C. Ikli, How Nations Negotiate 2 (Harper & Row 1964).
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focuses on the present while the latter looks to the future. For ex-
ample, in the labor area unions insist on higher current wages while
at the same time they press for job security in the face of automa-
tion. Similarly, in the concession area governments might demand
a larger share of current oil revenue while seeking to protect their
market supply position from invasion by old and new rivals.
In another respect, the shared continuity objective in the oil area
seems even stronger than in the labor area for two reasons. First,
most concessions have proved enormously rewarding to both parties
but promise to be increasingly more rewarding for the companies. It
appears that most of the companies have fully satisfied their reliance
interest through substantial recovery of their total capital invest-
ment. It remains for them to reap the profits in satisfaction of their
high expectation interests. However, this expectation interest seems
compressible when confronted with the possibility of cessation of
the arrangement. Second, the governments have frequently built up
a substantial reliance on the viability of the concessions by scheduling
vital development programs according to concession revenue projec-
tions. Consequently, the possibility of disruption is relevant not only
to the fear of the government's loss of position in the market, but
also to the threat of curtailment of economic development.
These considerations are persuasive that the parties to existing
concessions would have strong incentives for making compulsory
bargaining work in order to promote the durability of their rela-
tions. In addition, these factors are relevant in examining the bar-
gaining positions of the parties in point C infra.
C. Equality of Bargaining Power
The oil companies and governments possess the relative equality
of bargaining power which promises relative equality of participa-
tion and consent in the negotiation process, the optimum condition
of bargaining. For truly equal participation to be realizable, the bar-
gaining strength of the parties should be truly equal. However, rela-
tive equality is sufficient for substantive participation. Of course,
substantive participation advances the acceptability and integrity of
the bargaining process. It is difficult to see how much less than rela-
tive equality would impair the standard of substantive participation.
It is clear at the other extreme that disproportionate bargaining
power means dictation of the results by one party and participation
solely in the motions of bargaining by the other. Evaluation of the
relative bargaining positions of the parties should include several
factors. One factor is the relative degree of interest in preservation
JULY, 1966]
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of the relationship; this may be a limiting factor. Another is the
difficulty of calculation of real strength; the result is that the appear-
ance of strength may mean more to a confronted party. A third
factor may be the support offered by a third party. A fourth factor is
the extent of rational persuasion present in the negotiations; the
emphasis on bargaining power declines in the face of this pheno-
menon. The effect may be equalization of power by deemphasis. A
fifth factor is the enforcement of compulsory bargaining; if the
bargaining rules affect substantive negotiation, the law has recast the
relative balance of strength.
The root of economic power for union and government alike is
ultimate control over a resource essential to the productive enter-
prise. The union has the power to strike and the government has
the power of nationalization. Each weapon is ultimate in that it
stops production. Both weapons are authorized by the relevant law-
applying systems. The NLRA authorizes the strike; international
law approves nationalization. That the use of each weapon is qual-
ified does not detract from its contribution to bargaining power.
The validity of nationalization is conditioned only upon proper
compensation. However, the consequences of the use of these
economic weapons are quite different. Nationalization causes ter-
mination of the relationship; a strike causes only interruption. It
may be said that the sovereign power of nationalization (or expro-
priation) is a greater economic weapon than the strike. The answer
may be that the ultimate destructive characteristic of the weapon
severely limits the effectiveness of the threat of its use, a result not
unlike the ultimate power of atomic weapons. The NLRA or-
dered the relations between union and management; this ordering
creates the condition of relative equality of economic power. Natur-
ally, no such supra-governmental power is available to recast the
relative economic positions of oil companies and governments. How-
ever, the answer seems persuasive that no such authority is necessary.
It is contended that the international majors and the OPEC gov-
ernments possess relatively equal bargaining strength. This may be
proved by comparing the economic strengths of the international
majors and the OPEC governments. First, the government has
ultimate control over the oil. This may be compared to the com-
panies' control over the capital investment in the exploitation of oil
and, more importantly, the companies' control over the marketing
of oil. Although the majors' market power has theoretically declined
in ten years from about ninety per cent to seventy per cent of the
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direct foreign oil business, that twenty per cent loss of market con-
trol is substantially recaptured through the long term contracts the
majors have with independents who account for most of that so-
called loss. 24 Furthermore, the fact that there now exists an over-
supply of crude-oil and the economic prediction that this condition
is likely to continue25 reinforce the companies' position in relation
to the governments. In a condition of over-supply of crude-oil the
government must rely more on the marketing power of the com-
panies to dispose of production. In a condition of under-supply,
however, the government may be able to find alternative buyers and
place less reliance on the marketing power of the concessionaire. A
partial answer to this is that an increasing number of governments
are becoming buyers for the refining stage. Approximately 123
refineries are being built in fifty-seven countries, "many by the gov-
ernments themselves."26 The over-supply condition of the market
raises an additional possibility that enhances the oil companies'
position; this possibility is the risk of the replacement of part of
the concession country's share of the market by other exporting
countries or even by Russia. (By 1970 Russia is expected to supply
seven per cent of the free-world consuption of oil outside the
United States.) 2 7 Rival exporting countries replaced Persia's posi-
tion in the market when Musaddiq's nationalization program re-
sulted in his virtual inability to deliver oil to buyers. The major oil
companies refused to handle Persian oil pending a settlement while
the American Government, in mid-1953, suspended aid to Persia.
"Never since has Persian output caught up with that of either Saudi
Arabia or Kuwait. ' 28 The possibility exists that the American Gov-
ernment would act in support of "wronged" Anglo-American oil
companies in the Middle East, for as one historian described Amer-
ican foreign policy during the Suez crisis, "[O]ilmen were the most
powerful single influence in American policy in the Middle East:
they pressed on the State Department an insistent pro-Arab
policy."' 29 However, this possibility seems remote because it depends
upon a serious deterioration in the security of the Middle Eastern
oil supply. The American Government's pro-Arab policy in the
24. Burck, supra note 1, at 221.
25. Petroleum Press Service, supra note 4.
26. Burck, jupra note 1, at 130.
27. Id. at 129.
28. Monroe, op. cit. rupra note 6, at 109-10.
29. Finer, op. cit. jupra note 7, at 12.
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Middle East calls for a stabilizing influence on relations between
governments and oil companies; neutrality is an easier course than
discrimination.
It appears after thorough evaluation of these relevant factors
that the bargaining positions of the international majors and the
OPEC governments are nearly equal. Indeed, a substantial advan-
tage of one party over the other does not appear. Furthermore,
this appearance of relative equality of economic power is confirmed
by the recent settlement between OPEC and the majors. The terms
of the settlement seem to represent a relatively equal compromise
on the part of both groups."
D. Suitability of the Negotiation Process
The negotiation process is especially suited for settling the alloca-
tive kind of issues typically raised in oil disputes and, therefore, its
effectiveness of application to concession relations seems assured.
This proposition is merely the converse of Professor Fuller's view
that allocative (or "polycentric") problems are inappropriate for
solution by the adjudicative process.31 He distinguishes between the
functions of economic management and adjudication in operational
terms.
To act wisely, the economic manager must take into account every
circumstance relevant to his decision and must himself assume the
initiative in discovering what circumstances are relevant. His deci-
sions must be subject to reversal or change as conditions alter. The
judge, on the other hand, acts upon those facts that are in advance
deemed relevant under declared principles of decision. His decision
does not simply direct resources and energies; it declares rights, and
rights to be meaningful must in some measure stand firm through
changing circumstances. When, therefore, we attempt to discharge
tasks of economic management through adjudicative forms there is
a serious mismatch between the procedure adopted and the problem
to be solved.32
His reasoning may be extended to support the appropriateness of
the bargaining method in the case where two or more parties with
differing values jointly participate in economic allocation. Here
the bargaining method is a particularly useful collaborative tool.
30. The Economist, supra note 8, at 353.
31. L. L. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. Rev. 3, 30,
33.
32. L. L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 172 (Yale Univ. Press 1964).
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It possesses the flexibility to treat simultaneously all dimensions of
the "polycentric" (many-centered) problem of allocation. Within
its framework the parties are able to make a series of adjustments
in their positions on the various centers of the problem as they ap-
proach a basis of accommodation in which each gives up what he
values less in return for what he values more. Professor Fuller has
referred to this approach in connection with mediation;" it seems
equally applicable to negotiation in the oil context.
The nature of the problems in the labor and oil cases is typically
polycentric. For example, the labor dispute over a proper wage struc-
ture and the oil dispute over the proper price structure are parallel
cases presenting the problem of economic allocation. In each of
these cases the final determination rests on a pattern of terminal
adjustments. In a hypothetical concession dispute over the "financial"
provisions (as defined in the proposal) the negotiation process as
applied may be concerned with many centers of apportionment such
as posted pricing, expensing, proration, relinquishment, and customer
discounts. Assuming the parties are seeking settlement, the negotia-
tions will proceed with a continual shifting of the respective posi-
tions on the terminal issues. The parties will tend to relax their posi-
tion where the terminal issue is less important to them and press
their position where it is more important. The result of this progres-
sion of maneuvers is, ideally, the best possible settlement as seen by
both parties. Practically, the process may be seen as approaching
the most acceptable overall settlement. The relation between the ap-
propriateness of the method to the problem and the relation of the
nature of the problem to the result point to an extraordinary aspect
of negotiation in this context. The process of negotiation is partic-
ularly suitable for instantaneous treatment of the several dimensions
of an apportionment problem. At the same time, the dimensions of
the problem facilitate the most acceptable settlement (to the parties)
because the dimensions allow each of the parties to receive what he
values most after giving up what he values least. This infers that
in some cases settlement of a dispute may be made easier by enlarg-
ing the dimensions of the problem rather than by isolating the linear
sub-issues. It seems, however, that this technique of dimensional
enlargement ought to be confined to the cases presenting the alloca-
tive-characterized problem. Recognition of this phenomenon can-
not help but impress one of the great potential utility that this legal
process may have for ordering a variety of economic relations.
33. L. L. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. Rev. 3, 23.
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E. Rationality of Relations
The rationality of the relations between oil companies and gov-
ernments is sufficient to infer that the parties will make good use of
the bargaining process in settling their differences. Rationality of
the parties may mean either or both the willingness to disclose in-
formation necessary for inelligent discussion and willingness to be
persuaded by reason. These are distinguishable from the willingness
to bargain which is discussed below. Willingness to bargain clearly
does not require reasonableness of attitude and full disclosure of
relevant data. However, rationality in this dual sense greatly con-
tributes to sound bargaining results and sophisticated bargaining
relations. Conversely, mature bargaining relationships commonly
produce a high level of rationality in practice. Thus, rationality
seems to be both the cause and effect of good bargaining.
So far, in the labor relations area, the statutory duty to bargain
in good faith has not been interpreted to impose a standard of
rationality on the parties in either of the dual senses. The main
reason for this result is that either a standard of reasonableness or
a standard of disclosure would tend to affect the substantiative terms
of negotiation. Professor Cox emphasizes the relevance of informa-
tion to the substance of bargains when he concludes that, "today's
negotiations do not turn upon the ascertainment of objective facts
but upon the evaluation of the data. '84 He comments upon the pos-
sibility of imposing a standard of reasonableness upon the parties
in respect to major isues by saying that, "passing judgment upon
the reasonableness of his proposals . . . would apply pressure to
make concessions. . . . The policy of allowing free negotiation
upon such matters is too strong to warrant the risk of government
interference even when a weak inference might seem justified by ex-
perience. ' '8 5 Instead of compulsion, the voluntary approach to ration-
ality is advocated by Professor Cox and seems to be followed by the
National Labor Relations Board and the courts. The voluntary
course seems more likely to induce rational persuasion than does
compulsion. The foundation for rational persuasion seems to be
mutual respect and trust, which are achievable by choice rather than
fiat. The possibility of the lack of sophistication of government
negotiators is not unlike that which confronted unions a few years
ago. This possibility should not detract from the operation of the
process for three reasons: first, the OPEC settlement once again im-
34. Cox, supra note 17, at 1442.
35. Id. at 1419-20.
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plies that the government negotiators possess an adequate measure
of bargaining skill. Second, most of the OPEC governments have
had a great deal of experience in bargaining with the Anglo-Amer-
ican oil companies. Third, the bargaining process makes an indepen-
dent contribution by giving the government negotiators a training
ground; furthermore, the sophistication gap may be crossed in short
time. The possibility of a "collective" projection of irrationality into
negotiations from the government side may be similar to that which
exists in labor relations. Middle Eastern nationalism may represent
this kind of collective irrationality. One British historian, in describ-
ing the revival of Middle Eastern nationalism in the last decade,
notes that "resentment swelled at the uncommon degree of control
exercised by companies that managed not only production but the
marketing end of operation as well."8 36 She concludes that, "Middle
Eastern nationalism narrowed to vanishing point the gap between
the commercial and the diplomatic handling of oil affairs. ' 37 The
short answer to this objection that nationalism will project irration-
ality into concession bargaining is that the nationalist demands for
a share in the control of oil are being met by the institution of this
process.
F. Good Faith Standard
The good faith standard of bargaining presents the best balance
between compulsion of bargaining willingness and freedom of sub-
stantive bargaining for achieving good bargaining relations within
the concession framework. The willingness of the parties to bargain
necessarily influences how well the process works. Obviously, un-
willingness (refusal) to bargain defeats application of the process.
Beyond refusal, the extent of willingness necessary to make negotia-
tion actually meaningful is unclear. The statutory answer in the
labor relations field is the good faith standard, a minimum standard
of willingness. The choice of the good faith standard is governed
by the legislative policy of preserving the private autonomy of sub-
stantive decision making, while compelling the parties to have a will-
ing attitude toward settlement through bargaining.
Congress was generally not concerned with the substantive terms on
which the parties contracted. . . .Since the Board was not viewed
by Congress as an agency which should exercise its powers to arbi-
trate the parties' substantive solutions of the issues in their bargain-
36. Monroe, op. cit. supra note 6, at 114.
37. Ibid.
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ing, a check on this apprehended trend was provided by writing the
good faith test of bargaining into Section 8(d) of the [National
Labor Relations] Act.38
The good faith standard seeks to prevent two kinds of objection-
able conduct: non-compliance (refusal to bargain) and evasive
compliance (bargaining in form only). There may be several reasons
why the choice of this minimal standard has worked effectively.
First, the voluntary development of bargaining practice is more
likely to encourage good bargaining than the regulatory develop-
ment of such practice. The former is consistent with the voluntary
approach parties usually take in determining their own relations;
the latter is inconsistent. Regulation restrains conduct and too much
regulation could transform bargaining into adversary proceedings.
Second, regulation would seem to impair both the procedural flex-
ibility needed to uncover solutions to dimensional problems and the
guarantee of substantive participation and consent in the bargaining
results. (A questionable psychological factor is that the parties may
tend to respond better to the voluntary approach than to the in-
creased regulatory approach.) Third, the quality of adjudicative
enforcement by the NLRB has been a factor in the acceptance of the
fact of bargaining. Clear elaboration of the rules of good faith bar-
gaining and self-restraint in determination of the reach of good
faith have been policies which have carried the day for the good
faith concept in labor law. Fourth, compliance with the good faith
test is easy because it is a minimum standard of fairness in the rela-
tions between parties.
Since it is proposed that compulsory bargaining should be applied
in the same way as it is in labor relations, it may be expected that,
other things being equal, a similar record will be made in oil
relations.
G. Compromise Between Stability and Adjustability
The proposal for operation of compulsory bargaining herein ad-
vanced represents the most desirable compromise between the legal
desiderata of stability and adjustability of the arrangement. It
seems to be a necessary condition for the orderly development of
good bargaining practice that an appropriate balance be struck be-
tween the policies of stability of substantive terms governing the
relationship and the adjustability of these terms to the changing
conditions which create changing interests. This proposal chooses
38. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, 361 U.S. 477, 485 (1960).
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the "middle course" referred to by Professor Fuller" in providing
that the substance of each negotiated result should remain secure
for a reasonable term, such as three to five years. This permits a
sufficient degree of certainty for the parties to conduct their affairs,
while it retains the substantial guarantee of the opportunity for
effecting a change in interests. In the labor area Professor Cox em-
phasizes the importance of stability:
'Continuous negotiation over the basic terms of employment doesn't
contribute to a stable relationship and can seriously interfere with the
main job of labor and management-producing goods.' Effective co-
operation depends upon the mutual acceptance of basic principles de-
fining the framework within which the parties are to live.
40
In the concession area relative stability of the substance of the
bargain seems equally important. The right to seek a change in
"financial" terms is also very important. This is demonstrated once
again by the implied motives for the OPEC negotiations. It is
further demonstrated by the inclusion in Article 21, Section 6 of
the Iranian "Draft Agency," 1964, (the format for the Iranian
Concessions to Persian Gulf Rights awarded in 1965) of the pro-
vision that "changes . . . in the price structure of Middle East
crude-oil" is a ground for revision of the taxing terms. 41 Therefore,
it appears that the recommended proposal adequately recognizes
these considerations.
In summary, it has been shown that the relevant conditions for
the successful application of the bargaining process prevail in the
concession context and may be even more favorable in some instances
than in the analogous labor-management context.
IV
ALTERNATIVES WITHIN THE ALTERNATIVE
A. Definition of the Subject Matter of Bargaining
There seem to be four important possibilities for defining bargain-
able subjects: (1) all allocative issues; (2) "financial" issues; (3)
specific issues like taxation, pricing, and the like, and (4) any of the
39. L. L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 172 (Yale Univ. Press 1964).
40. A. Cox & J. T. Dunlop, The Duty to Bargain Collectively During the Term of
an Existing Agreement, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1097, 1115 (1950).
41. Petroleum Legislation, Supp. No. V, Middle East: Basic Oil Laws and Conces-
sion Contracts, Iran B-28 (1964).
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above three with a limitation on the extent of change permitted to
result from bargaining.
For the most consistency with the preceeding analysis of the
conditions determinative of good bargaining, alternative ( 1 ) should
be selected. However, this may be accomplished by broadening the
plain meaning of "financial" to include all allocative issues. It may
be stipulated that "financial" subjects are bargainable and that this
category includes, but is not limited to, the questions of pricing,
taxation, proration, relinquishment, royalty, and discounts. Con-
versely, if it is desired to narrow the "financial" category of subjects,
this alternative is available. For example, the parties might want to
fix the terms of relinquishment and royalty for the whole life of the
concession. This may be expressly stipulated. Whenever a dispute
arises concerning either of these issues, the possibility that the
nature of the issue is allocative may cause the parties to view its
referral to arbitration as unacceptable. If it is referred to arbitra-
tion, the nature of the problem will be mismatched with the process
of settlement; the result may then be undesirable. The objection to
a quantitative limitation on the settlement possible through negotia-
tion (alternative 4) is that the policy of free negotiation is violated.
The policy of voluntary development of good bargaining practice
is preferable to imposed bargaining practice through control of the
substance of the terms. A quantitative limitation on the substance of
the terms, such as percentages varying with the period of renegotia-
tion, certainly controls the settlement.
The objection may be made that some non-allocative issues should
be put within the scope of bargainable subjects. The reply is two-
fold. First, some degree of long term stability of the arrangement
is necessary to conduct the kind of venture that depends on long
term operation for its success. An oil concession venture is this
type. The qualitative distinction between allocative and non-alloca-
tive is convenient for dividing the stable from the variable provisions
of the arrangement. Second, a reason for making the non-allocative
provisions stable is that their nature involves rights which, to be
meaningful, ought to stand firm under changing circumstances. Thus,
those provisions which require stability are matched with the con-
cession need for stability of some provisions. This is not to say that
disputes over non-allocative (justiciable) issues are not to be au-
thoritatively determined. Such disputes are referred to the adjudi-
cative machinery of arbitration which is suited to apply legal prin-
ciples or standards in deciding relative rights. By contrast, the bar-
gaining machinery is not suited to the non-allocative dispute because
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it does not apply law in reaching a settlement. In short, it may be
said that there is one "right" answer to non-allocative questions,
whereas there are many conceivable "right" answers to allocative
questions. Adjudication is designed to determine the "right" answer,
while negotiation is designed to hit on any one of numerable ac-
commodations.
Of the possible allocative issues within the scope of bargainable
subjects, the ones identified under the "financial" label above have
been actual or appear to be forseeable causes of concession disputes.
The list is certainly not all-inclusive. If the "financial" label is
chosen, it may be desirable to make amendment of the list of bar-
gainable subjects itself bargainable. Similarly, bargaining may be
provided for the determination of the periods between operation of
the duty to bargain. In each case some limitations may be practically
desirable.
B. Definition of the Duty of Good Faith Bargaining
It is suggested that the subjective test of good faith bargaining
be formulated in the negative as proposed by Judge Magruder.
He defined "bad faith" bargaining as a "desire not to reach an
agreement. ' 42 This formulation has the advantages of best de-
scribing the actual results of the case law and not compelling a party
to put reaching agreement ahead of maintaining a position. This
distinction may prove important in limiting the enforcement reach of
compulsory bargaining to non-substantive terms.
Alternatively, the standard may be formulated in the affirmative:
each party has a duty to "engage in negotiations with a sincere de-
sire to reach an agreement and must make an earnest effort to reach
a common ground, but it need make no concession and may reject
any terms it deems unacceptable." 44
Labor experiences furnish enforcement guidelines that may be
useful in the determination of bad faith bargaining practice in oil
relations.45 Evidence of bad faith, which must be weighed according
to the circumstances, includes but is not limited to: (1) declaration
inferring bad faith; (2) stalling negotiations by unexplained delays
in answering correspondence and by unnecessary postponement of
meetings; (3) sending negotiators without authority to do more
than listen; (4) repudiating commitments made by a negotiator
after the other party has been led to believe the negotiator had
42. NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir. 1953).
43. Cox, supra note 17, at 1416.
44. ibid.
45. Id. at 1418-19.
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real authority to agree; (5) constantly shifting position or inter-
jecting new demands just as agreement seems imminent; (6) in-
sistence upon verbatim transcript of negotiations; (7) rejecting
a standard or trivial provision; (8) refusal to make counter-
proposals, and (9) making demands having only the objective of
obstruction. Evidence of bad faith, however, may not include evalua-
tion of a party's position relative to a major bargaining issue. The
latter clause places a negative limitation on application of the
standard; it is a clear statement of the policy of non-interference
with bargaining.
It is possible to include rules of bad faith. The disadvantage with
this approach is that it tends to convert the substantive standard
into objective criteria which regulate bargaining practice. This po-
tential result is contrary to the policies of voluntary development
of good bargaining practice and free negotiations.
C. Operation of the Duty To Bargain in Good Faith
There may be several possibilities which contend for selection as
the best resolution of the competing policies of stability of the bar-
gain and changeability to new needs. Regarding the initial period
of a new concession prior to the operation of compulsory bargain-
ing, it is suggested that this period be determined by: (1) a fixed
number of years; (2) a length of time commensurate with the com-
pany's recovery of capital investment in addition to a reasonable
return on the balance of the investment, or (3) an indefinite length
of time until a material change of condition occurs which makes the
original apportionment inapplicable.
The clear advantage of (1) is its definiteness. For example, a
twenty-five year concession with three five-year renewal periods (as
in the Iranian "Consortium" Agreement) may provide for bar-
gaining at the end of ten or fifteen years and at the end of each
five-year period thereafter. The definiteness of a fixed number of
years reinforces the formal guarantee of the right to participate in
the redetermination of financial terms. Furthermore, this provision
is easily enforceable.
The advantage of (2) is that it matches the period of concession
stability with the reason for the importance of stability; that is, pro-
tection of the reliance interest by allowance of compensation for the
investment of risk-capital (recovery plus a reasonable profit). Sub-
sequently, the profit expectation interest becomes subject to periodic
bargaining. Further, although admittedly a compromise, this alter-
native seems to provide a sufficiently definite guarantee of the right
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to renegotiation as to preclude difficulties in compliance and to induce
a faith in the fairness of the procedure. One practical difficulty may
be in designing a proper method of accounting for this scheme.
However, this is not an insurmountable managerial problem. The
right to examine accounting records must be included as a check on
the method.
A refinement which may be applied to alternative (2) would be
to provide for the transfer of ownership (equity) of the concession
assets to the government simultaneously with the recovery of capital.
The government would then own the concession assets when com-
pulsory bargaining starts to operate. The purpose of this would be
to remove from the arrangement the possibility of nationalization
and the political connotations. The threat of nationalization, as an
ultimate economic weapon, has a severely limited use; if anything,
it confuses concession relations. In turn, confusion detracts from the
stability of the arrangement. Furthermore, ownership of the assets
does not seem relevant to the bargaining position of either party.
Where the oil companies own the assets, the country may at any
time expropriate them. Ownership seems only relevant as a seed to
nationalistic unrest. One consequence of this proposal may be to
neutralize nationalistic resentment of foreign ownership of the oil.
Yet the security of the concession contract remains intact. The bar-
gaining positions are unaffected. A potential political explosive is
disarmed and stability of the arrangement is advanced a little
further.
The advantage of (3) is that it matches the period of stability of
the concession arrangement with the stability of material condi-
tions affecting the arrangement. In contrast, alternative (2) relates
the period of stability to the duration of the reliance interest of the
companies. It is alternatively possible that conditions could change
before the reliance interest runs out or that conditions remain stable
beyond the end of the reliance interest. Therefore, one disadvantage
of (3) to the companies is that it does not protect their reliance in-
terest in the large capital investment made. A practical disadvantage
of (3) is the difficulty a party would have in showing a material
change in conditions which justifies redetermination of some alloca-
tive terms. This difficult burden of proof falls on the affected party,
whether government or company. The uncertainties created as to
whether or when such a change might occur and whether the burden
of proof can be met before the other party or arbitral forum appear
to outweigh its theoretical advantage of relating the operation of
renegotiation of certain terms to the need for redetermination of
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those terms caused by factors outside the control and expectation
of the parties.
Of particular interest is a variation of alternative (3) that may
be found in the 1964 Iranian "Draft Agency" which apparently
served as the format for the recently awarded Persian Gulf con-
cessions. Article 21, Section 6, provides:
In case of changes taking place in the price structure of Middle East
crude oil or in the Iranian taxation regulations, the parties to the
agreement will through negotiation settle on new arrangements which
in no circumstances shall be less favorable to Iran.4 6
If this clause survived in the recently awarded concessions, several
interesting and far-reaching questions may be raised. First, what
kind of changes in the price structure are necessary to invoke nego-
tiations? Any change or substantial change? A change in any incre-
ment of pricing? Second, if the proper change takes place, what
terms of the arrangement are negotiable? Any or all terms or only
allocative or certain allocative (financial) terms? Third, does the
obligation to negotiate mean the obligation to negotiate in good
faith? If so, by what standard is good faith judged?
Within the context of the Iranian Concession, these questions
remain open. However, the third question invites a rather surpris-
ing answer that is within the scope of this article. It appears that
Article 21, Section 6, may be interpreted to give the Iranian con-
cession the essence of the compulsory good faith bargaining method
proposed herein. The concession provides that the parties will ad-
here to the principle of good faith in their relations under the con-
cession agreement. Article 21, Section 6, states that upon the hap-
pening of a certain event the parties "will through negotiation settle
on new arrangements. 4 7 The language of this phrase purports to
impose two duties on the parties upon the occurrence of the event
necessary to set the clause into motion. The first is the duty to settle
and the second is the duty to settle by the negotiation procedure. The
only problem is that the first duty seems unenforceable. If an impasse
in the negotiations develops, forcing the parties to settle is involun-
tary and therefore is contrary to the voluntary way "through nego-
tiations." A more meaningful construction of the phrase is to say
that it does not go so far as to force a settlement but does go so
far as to force the parties to negotiate with a view to settlement. The
46. Petroleum Legislation, supra note 41. (Emphasis added.)
47. Ibid.
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consequence of this construction is to shift the emphasis from set-
tlement to negotiation. The duty to negotiate is enforceable. In
filling-in the content of the duty to negotiate (which is not otherwise
elaborated in this clause), the enforcement agency should look ini-
tially to the terms of the concession. An important term requires
application of the good faith standard of conduct to concession
relations. It may be urged that such a standard applies to negotia-
tions required in Article 21, and further that the analogy of the
American labor law concept of good faith bargaining may be re-
ferred to in defining the good faith standard of Article 21 negotia-
tion. To the extent that the enforcement agency (for example, an
arbitral tribunal) accepts that Article 21 negotiations are subject
to the good faith standard and that good faith can be defined by
reference to the labor law analogy, the substance of the proposal
made in this Article could be imported to the Iranian Concession.
The relative degree of stability and changeability allowed in the
results of each periodic negotiation raises questions. The labor
experience suggests a reasonable period of three to five years.
This length of time seems to allow enough certainty for company
planning and uninterrupted production of oil. It also is close to the
length of time that oil market changes appear predictable. Finally,
it also affords sufficient time for the parties to prepare for bargain-
ing. Another possibility would be the alternative of a fixed period
(for example four years) or a period as set in the negotiated set-
tlement. In the absence of setting a period, the fixed period could
automatically apply. One objection to this method is that it may
project the bargaining position into the future and cause an impair-
ment of the legal guarantee of participation in the process by mak-
ing operation of the right to bargain itself bargainable.
D. Design of the Enforcement Procedure
An enforcement tribunal is an integral element of the bargaining
method. It fills in the content of the right to participate in sub-
stantive negotiation. The character of enforcement by the admin-
istrative tribunal is relevant to the success of the whole process.
Thus, the rules for its operation are important.
There are three important alternatives for selection of an ad-
ministrative tribunal:
(1) The individual concession may provide for an ad hoc method
for the formation of a tribunal to decide an individual dispute. This
method is parallel to the arbitration procedure customarily afforded
to concession parties.
JULY, 1966]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
(2) The major industry groups (OPEC governments and con-
cession companies) may agree to formally establish a continuing
adjudicative tribunal which would have jurisdiction over individual
concession disputes. The tribunal may be established for a certain
term of years or on a permanent basis.
(3) Such industry groups may agree to a modification of the
above suggestion. Instead of putting the continuing industry tribunal
on a fulltime basis, they may put it on a standby basis. The members
of this standby enforcement commission, although regularly serving
in other capacities, would be called to serve on the commission as
disputes may arise before it.
One advantage of the ad hoc procedure is that its use corresponds
more closely with the periodic operation of compulsory bargaining,
combined with the possibility of infrequent bad faith allegations.
Its disadvantage is identical with that of present arbitration clauses.
The apparent delay and dislike of the procedure results in its non-
use.
As a practical matter, it seems that the acceptability of the con-
tinuing industry-level tribunal depends on the latitude of the ac-
ceptability of compulsory bargaining. However, the advantages of a
continuing industry-level, law-applying agency are many and signifi-
cant. The fact of availability of a forum encourages settlement of
disputes in the early stages, increases the probability of its use, and
makes more meaningful the right and duty of bargaining. The con-
tinuing nature and wide international jurisdiction would promote
competence and fairness of adjudication. The judges would be able
to acquire broad understanding and experience in filling the void
of concession law and would be able to bring those authoritative
determinations to bear on a broad sector of international relation-
ships in a uniform fashion. The government and company endorse-
ment of and submission to this international agency would seem to
insure its prestige and authority and be a significant step toward the
peaceful settlement of disputes through law. The costs would be
small as compared to the stake the parties have in the great wealth
of oil.
It appears that the standby qualification of the continuing agency
is especially appropriate because it embraces solely the favorable
features of each of the other alternatives. The standby character
of its machinery matches the uncertain or periodic enforcement
responsibility provided by the proposal. Yet, unlike the ad hoc
method, there should be no delay or dislike in calling upon the
agency. The forum is available on call, by definition, and the con-
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tinuing membership of the standby forum should enable the mem-
bers to develop expertness and consistency in their determinations.
Further advantages may be that more qualified and distinguished ad-
ministrators and judges could serve on such a standby organization
and that such an agency may be more politically suited to launch
the program. Eventually, if the need justifies a full time agency, the
change could be easily effectuated.
A description of the way the administrative tribunal should work,
whether in an ad hoc or institutional manner, follows. Either party
to a concession may invoke the tribunal by the proper allegation of
unfair bargaining practice (bad faith). Either the ad hoc or the in-
dustry tribunal would be constituted by impartial and experienced
judges and administrators, as is customarily provided in arbitration
clauses. The tribunal would first determine if the issue of bargaining,
about which an unfair practice was charged, is a proper subject
of bargaining. This means the allocative or "financial" test would
be applied. If the issue is determined to be a proper subject, the tri-
bunal would determine the issue of good or bad faith. One should
note that the issue of good or bad faith is non-allocative. As a prac-
tical matter, the industry tribunal may be used to decide the merits
of all non-allocative issues which arise; this includes good faith bar-
gaining and any other issues arising from the execution of the con-
cession. If the tribunal determines that the issue is an improper sub-
ject of bargaining, its jurisdiction over the non-allocative issue of
good or bad faith is divested. However, it may determine the non-
allocative issue itself as a matter of convenience. The remedy avail-
able to the parties is limited to the authoritative determination; it
should contain an order to cease an unfair practice where it exists.
Sanctions have no place or basis in this system. Review may be
made obtainable through the invocation of another ad hoc body or
through the dubious route of petition to the International Court
of Justice. However, review seems unnecessary since second-order
compliance is so easy and the incentives are many and strong for
the parties to get on with the business of their relationship.
V
REASONS FOR CHOICE OF THE ALTERNATIVE
A. Governments Should Find This Proposal Acceptable
The proposal furnishes a real incentive for the governments to
comply with the apportionment terms of concession agreements
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which was formerly lacking: specifically, the substantive right to
participate and consent through negotiation in future decisions con-
cerning potentially unfavorable financial terms; generally, the right
of real participation and consent in the decision relating to the ap-
portionment of oil wealth. The rule of law replaces the grace of oil
companies in assuring a meaningful collaboration in the control of
oil.
The proposal is an instrument through which oil companies are
legally compelled to recognize in good faith the exporting govern-
ments as equal partners in the production of oil. This forms the basis
for the development of mutual confidence and trust among the
parties. Governments appear to have nearly equal, if not equal,
bargaining power in relation to the oil companies; thus, the govern-
ments need not fear that an economic advantage lies with the oil
companies.
The good faith standard of bargaining, a minimal standard of
conduct, is easy for the governments to comply with. They need not
fear that their rights relative to the non-substantive issues will be
adjudicated so long as they comply with this easy standard. Further-
more, their rights relative to the substantive issues of bargaining,
the apportionment issues, will not be adjudicated at all.
Adoption of this proposal will predictably enhance the position
of the leaders of the governments at home by satisfying the nation-
alist demands for more control of the oil. In addition, adoption of
this proposal promises to further enhance the reputation and pres-
tige of the governments and OPEC in the international community,
because it is a step in bringing law to bear on international relation-
ships.
The implementation of the proposal may even be a face-saving
way out of the dilemma that confronts OPEC and its member gov-
ernments. This dilemma is the inevitable dissension of members
caused by the inherently conflicting interests in oil. This conflict is
demonstrated by the views of certain governments toward the issues
of proration and relinquishment. For example, Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait oppose proration because of their vast oil reserves, whereas,
Venezuela favors proration because of its comparatively small re-
serves. Iraq delayed acceptance of the OPEC settlement because of
its special relinquishment problems. On the positive side, OPEC
has much to gain in the international community by endorsing this
proposal and seeking to establish an industry tribunal for dealing
with the financial disputes. After all, acceptance of this proposal
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by the oil companies would represent a major triumph for OPEC in
obtaining more control of oil for the member governments.
B. Oil Companies Should Find This Proposal Acceptable
Adoption of the proposal should neutralize those OPEC activ-
ities which the companies view as disruptive of the business of
foreign oil development. This would mean that legal uncertainty
and political irrationality, apparent corollaries to the OPEC re-
negotiations, would be reduced or eliminated by the proposal. The
proposal would bring law to bear on the negotiations, which is now
absent. It would localize disputes at the concession level, making
settlement easier by routine treatment in the early stage before
the issues become politically inflated. It is persuasive that there
would be much more stability under the proposal than under present
circumstances. This view is supported in the Petroleum Press Ser-
vice, where it is suggested that oil companies would regard a firm
commitment not to alter the financial terms for a certain period
within the duration of the agreement as worth more than the present
unlimited guarantee which is in reality dishonored by OPEC's
efforts.4 s
Adoption of the proposal appears to be a way for the oil com-
panies to secure present government compliance, which is not now
secured. It lays a foundation for a pattern of government compliance
which should provide additional protection in the future.
It has been shown that the marketing power of oil companies
within a market structure characterized by an increasing over-supply
of crude oil supports the view that the companies have a nearly
equal, if not equal, bargaining position in relation to that of the
governments. Thus, they should not fear any disadvantage in bar-
gaining participation under the proposal; nor should they fear any
drastic action by the governments after adoption of this proposal.
Acceptance of the proposal should also neutralize the influence of
nationalistic irrationality upon the leaders of the exporting govern-
ments. The combination of a substantial reduction in the influence of
nationalism on government leaders and the enhancement of their
positions for gaining a share of the control of the vital national re-
source would appear to induce more responsibility on the part of
these leaders, along with the greater control of the economic man-
agement of oil.
48. 31 Petroleum Press Service 404 (1964).
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The proposal appears to accord more with reality than does the
present order (or disorder) of oil relations. It seems that the profit
expectation interest is dominant with respect to old concessions and,
therefore, application of compulsory bargaining to them would sub-
ject that expectation interest to redetermination under more certain
conditions. That is far better than subjecting the expectation in-
terest to continuous redetermination with OPEC. Furthermore, the
reliance interest would still be protected with respect to new con-
cessions under the proposal. The suggestion that the periods of new
concessions should be lessened can be persuasively resisted under
the proposal and hence the time necessary for payback of the large
investment may be protected.
Adoption of the proposal means a probable stabilization of the
oil industry for the long-term in exchange for giving up nothing that
is not already taken, except without legal restraint, at the present
time. By making their international legal arrangements (concession
agreements) work better through application of this proposal, the
oil companies would be making international law work better, a sub-
stantial contribution to the international legal climate for all com-
mercial relations.
VI
REBUTTAL
Some argue that the proposal will result in the reduction or
elimination of the oil companies' incentives to risk the large capital
investment necessary to undertake concession exploration. Com-
mercial oil might not be found in many cases and consequently, in-
vested capital would be lost. However, as the argument goes, when-
ever commercial oil is discovered in sufficient quantities to return
the capital investment in addition to a profit, the profit would be
negotiable under the proposal. Consequently, the total risk on cap-
ital investment in oil exploration is not covered by the successful
instances.
The answer to this argument rests on the following four proposi-
tions: first, the incentive to invest capital in oil exploration is already
declining and is expected to decline under present conditions.
[T]he Big Seven have already adjusted to the times by not expand-
ing capital investment, particularly in exploration and production,
as much as they may have. . . . At the same time, the incentive to
spend a lot of money looking for crude will automatically continue to
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decline. (When, if, and as the threat of scarcity becomes evident, it
will automatically rise again.) Meantime capital outlays for explora-
tion and production will claim a smaller proportion of revenues.
49
Furthermore, it seems clear that the proposal provides more
stability for financial provisions than does the current industry
practice of renegotiation at the whim of OPEC and the grace of the
oil companies.
Second, the uncertainty of the existence of commercial quantities
of oil is reduced to the extent that this proposal is limited to oil
exporting countries. One oil company executive referred to a con-
cession covering areas in the Persian Gulf as lying within "the
world's most prolific oil-producing basin." 0 This uncertainty in oil
exporting countries is less than in producing, but non-exporting,
countries and is much less than in non-producing countries.
Third, the proposal provides for the recovery of invested capital
plus a reasonable return on the balance of the investment. This
covers all of the reliance interest and a reasonable portion of the
profit expectation interest before the operation of compulsory bar-
gaining. The reasonableness of the profit expectation portion re-
ceived along with the recovery of capital is determined by the
parties; its determination may be made with reference to the risk
foreseen in undertaking the concession. It may be that a reasonable
return relevant to one risk is five per cent on the balance of capital
investment while relative to another risk it could be fifty per cent.
Fourth, the remainder of the profit expectation interest is bar-
gainable; and the bargaining strength of the oil company will cover
some proportion of the remaining expectation. Strength of bargain-
ing is bolstered by a government's reliance on the company for its
marketing power in a buyer's market and its fear of replacement of
its market supply position by either friendly or unfriendly exporting
rivals.
Another objection is directed not at the proposal but at the bur-
den of persuasion. A proponent of the proposal may be asked to cite
instances where the dispute might not have culminated in national-
ization had the proposal been in force. For example, could the pro-
posal have prevented the Mexican oil expropriation of 1938 or the
Persian oil nationalization of 1951 ?
The short answer appears to be that it is difficult to determine
49. Burck, supra note 1, at 222.
50. New York Times, Feb. 18, 1965, p. 47, col. 4.
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whether the negotiation method, if applied, could have saved either
situation because of the intensities of the revolutionary movements
involved. It is more difficult to determine whether the negotiation
method could have been applied at all in the Mexican situation be-
cause of the absence of a concession system.
The British historian, Elizabeth Monroe, suggests:
Perhaps no scheme short of total foreign capitulation to Persian de-
mands would by 1951 have been acceptable, for the tide of anti-
foreign feeling in Persia had been running so high since the Second
World War that a succession of Persian governments felt bound
to swim with it.5 1
Conversely, it is possible that some of the Persian grievances
could have been better handled through the negotiation method
sometime prior to 1951. The main complaints appeared to center
on the financial terms of pricing and taxation. If the Government had
been legally assured of the opportunity to renegotiate the financial
terms at a certain date, the proposal might have served as an escape
valve for nationalist and Anglophobia pressures. Furthermore, the
British Government may have refused in bad faith to disclose the
price paid by the British Navy for Persian oil and an authoritative
determination to that effect might have dampened the rising tension.
It seems that the proposal might have been successful in checking the
causes of nationalization to the extent that it had been in operation
close to the time when they originated. For the reasons stated else-
where in this paper concerning the likely impact of this legal method
upon nationalistic excesses, it appears that the Persian oil dispute
could very well have been settled if the proposal had been in force.
The Mexican situation was in a class by itself. There were no con-
cession arrangements between the Government and oil companies
within which the proposed negotiation method could have been ap-
plied. A concession system pre-supposes that the grantor owns the
oil. Ownership of the oil was the central issue of dispute. The Min-
ing Code of 1884 departed from Spanish law by providing that
petroleum was, from that date, property of the surface owner. 2
Minerals remained the property of the Government and mining was
administered by a concession system. Although the Mexican Gov-
ernment passed a Petroleum Law in 1928 which provided that
51. Monroe, op. cit. supra note 6, at 111.
52. W. C. Gordon, The Expropriation of Foreign-owned Property in Mexico 57
(American Council on Public Affairs 1941).
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companies' titles to oil which were obtained prior to May 1917
must be exchanged for "confirmatory concessions" of unlimited
duration, the legislation was a compromise agreement between
Calles and the companies. Thus, the "confirmatory concessions" were
no different from the prior fee simple titles."3 Additionally, the
''confirmatory concessions" were merely a form of registration and
not agreements between the Government and companies. Conse-
quently there did not exist direct legal arrangements such as conces-
sion agreements within which the proposed method could have been
installed.
Even if a legal standard of good faith negotiation could have been
applied in some way to the relations between the Government and
oil companies, such a standard would not have been formally ap-
plicable to the 1937 dispute which precipitated the expropriation.
The formal parties to the dispute were the oil companies and an
oil labor syndicate-not the Government. Furthermore, Mexican
law governed labor-management disputes and a federal labor
board (subject to supreme court review) handled these labor dis-
putes. Even if the substantive good faith of the Government con-
cerning the labor dispute could have been questioned by some
procedure, once the 1937 oil strike started the domestic procedure
for dealing with labor disputes, government compliance with the
good faith determination may have been impossible. From the ac-
counts published by the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and
the Mexican Government, the inference may be drawn that all the
parties were probably in very bad faith according to the standard
set forth in the proposal.54
The foreign mining companies in Mexico were not nationalized
for a combination of reasons. First, they were under a concession
system and hence were not entrenched like the oil companies because
of a strong legal claim of ownership of sub-soil property. Second,
they were decentralized and somewhat passive, whereas, the oil
companies were very powerful and active in protecting their inter-
ests. The consequence may have been that the revolutionary leaders
directed their foreign resentment against the big oil corporations
rather than the diverse mining concessionaires. These two factors in-
dicate that a rather weak incentive to take over the mining com-
panies existed.
53. Id. at 72.
54. Government of Mexico, The True Facts About the Expropriation of the Oil
Companies' Properties in Mexico 30 (Gov't of Mexico 1940) ; Standard Oil Company
of New Jersey, The Reply to Mexico 21-22 (Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey 1940).
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Third, government timing was fortunate for the mining com-
panies. The Government did not turn its attention to mining until
after it had taken over the oil and railroad industries. Two mount-
ing pressures were brought to bear on the Government at about
this time: international political pressures for compensation or
restoration of expropriated property and internal financial difficulties
partly caused by the losing operations of the seized oil and railroad
industries.
Furthermore, the mining industry was the source of the govern-
ment's largest source of revenue and the United States Government
was virtually the sole customer for silver-a major branch of the
industry.5 In 1938 Mexico agreed to pay at least 1 million dollars a
year in settlement of agrarian expropriation claims and it has been
suggested that the United States and Mexican Governments "tacitly
agreed that most of this sum would come from increased export
taxes on the mining industry, which would be principally carried by
the silver exports, and therefore indirectly by the United States gov-
ernment."56 These circumstances demonstrate that there were
rather strong incentives for the Mexican Government to leave the
mining industry in peace.
CONCLUSION
Experts on oil concession law have often testified that an alterna-
tive to the existing form of concession agreements is vitally needed.
[T]here is much room for new constructive ideas and for flexible
development in both the basic structure and the technical details of
compacts of this nature.57
It seems true that the parties to a concession agreement would
each surrender, to a small extent, a prerogative which it formally
regards as "sovereign." For the concession company it means relin-
quishment of some of its formal control over apportionment deci-
sions. For the government it means voluntary submission in a limited
manner to international legal processes. In addition, this pro-
posal means that both parties would have to assume more responsi-
55. Gordon, op. cit. supra note 52, at 147.
56. Id. at 148.
57. J. G. Wetter, Salient Clauses in International Investment Contracts, 17 Bus.
Law. 967, 971 (1962).
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bility. The concession company must become more politically sensi-
tive and the government must become commercially sensible. Yet the
reward is disproportionate to the cost of this middle course. The
value to the government could eventually be the realization of eco-
nomic development for the country. The value to the oil companies
could be long-term profitability for the oil business. The value to the
free world may be a major contribution to peace, both through secur-
ing the supply of oil for Western defense and by easing tensions in
those areas of the world affected by oil.
